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THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND
SEPTEMBER 11TH:
WAKE-UP CALL TO GET THE TREATIES RIGHT
LARRY D. JOHNSON*
There are two international treaties currently being drafted specifically on
nuclear terrorism.' Both could require that specific measures be taken worldwide
to protect and secure nuclear facilities from terrorist attack and sabotage; but
neither one does. United States' efforts to include such requirements were
thwarted by some of our closest "coalition" allies before September 1 th. Now is
the time to revive those efforts. September 11th should have taught us some
important lessons.
LESSONS OF SEPTEMBER 1 ITH

The first lesson is that we can no longer assume that no one "in his right
mind" would commit a terrorist act for fear of dying or being exposed to dangerous
ionizing radiation. It is now clear that large numbers of people are more than
willing to die as martyrs for a cause. This undercuts a presumption, which up to
now, played a major role behind assessments of what is required to defend nuclear
materials and facilities against terrorists and sabotage.
The second lesson is drawn from the first: so-called "dirty" bombs are now
more plausible. We can no longer assume that a terrorist will be deterred by
concerns of self-preservation in order to build or disperse a "dirty" bomb, a
conventional explosive device designed to disperse radioactivity, whether as a
result of radioactive material being made a part of the device, or it being made the
target of the device. For example, a bomb directed at a nuclear reactor or a spent
fuel pond where "used" but highly radioactive fuel rods are cooling is a "dirty"
bomb. The effects of such a "dirty" bomb would not, of course, equal the
devastation of exploding a nuclear device, but its effects would be psychological

" Homer G. and Ann Berryhill Angelo Visiting Professor of Law at UC Davis School of Law in
California for the academic year 2001-2002, served as The Legal Adviser of the LAEA from 1997 to
2001. Prior to that he served as Principal Legal Officer in the Office of the UN Legal Counsel. He is a
graduate of the Harvard Law School, the JFK School of Government of Harvard University and the
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I. See Larry D. Johnson, Lessons of 9/11 for the Protection and Security of all Radioactive
Material, Pacific Council on International Policy, at http://www.pacificcouncil.org (last visited Sept.
22, 2002).
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and politically calamitous. In the town of Goifnia in Brazil, the rupture of a
radioactive "source," which had been used for medical purposes but carelessly
discarded caused disruption, panic, several deaths, and hundreds of people,
buildings, and large tracts of land to be contaminated. 2
The third lesson is, what happens in other parts of the world can have a direct
impact upon Americans' safety and security. While we strive to make sure our
own nuclear facilities are safe from theft or sabotage, a potential terrorist might
well be able to obtain material through theft or illegal purchase in other countries
for delivery to our doorstep. There are technical limitations in detecting nuclear
material at border locations For example, do we know how well the containers
arriving at the Port of Newark are screened? The preventive approach calls for
measures to make sure the material never leaves its place of origin, as we attempt
to do with other material we do not want to enter the country.
Fourth, as far as terrorism treaties are concerned, they miss the mark. They
focus on criminalizing the acts and punishing the terrorists, but only after the thief
has let the horse out of the barn. 4 In view of the nature of this beast - dangerous
radioactive material - the point should be to make sure the thief does not get
anywhere near the barn. Nuclear terrorism treaties should require specific
measures of prevention to make it harder for would-be terrorists to commit acts of
nuclear terrorism.
WHAT'S NEEDED?

Today, there are no binding preventive measures on the international level;
each country is on its own. It is the responsibility of national governments to
provide for protection and security as part of their "sovereign" rights and
responsibilities. 5 That does not fly after September 1Ith. Today, it is in our best
interest to have countries thousands of miles away apply preventive measures to
make it more difficult for terrorists to get their hands on this material and to inflict
harm on others including our own citizens.
WHAT KIND OF "DANGEROUS" RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

In the past, treaties and international regulation have focused on certain
radioactive material considered "dangerous" because it can be used to make
nuclear weapons. 6 Such "fissionable" material can start a chain reaction, which if
2. See INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA), THE RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT IN
GOIANIA, (Vienna 1988).
3. See Johnson, supra note 1.
4. Doug Cassel, With UN Help, US. Has Tools for Pursuit; Desperately Seeking Osama,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 2001, availableat http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/ihr/issues/
tribteffor102101 I.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
5. Larry D. Johnson, Treaties Against Nuclear Terrorism: The Global Legal Framework can
Make a Difference, IAEA Bulletin 44/1/2002, available at http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Periodicals/
Bulletin/Bul1441/article2.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2002).
6. See Johnson, supra note 5.
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uncontrolled would lead to a nuclear explosion.7 This material is highly enriched
uranium and plutonium, which can also be used for peaceful purposes in nuclear
power plants to produce a controlled chain reaction. 8 It is this "nuclear material"
that is the subject of various non-proliferation treaties and agreements. 9 This
material may be described in a non-technical way as "weapons-usable" radioactive
material.
The interesting thing is that such material, depending on the
circumstances and the particular stage in the process, may or may not be
particularly dangerous to your health.' 0
Other radioactive material is not fissionable and thus cannot be used to
produce a nuclear explosion or weapon, but is nevertheless "dangerous" because
the ionizing radiation it emits may do serious damage to your health. This kind of
material is used, for example, in medicine and industry and is meant to be subject
to strict national regulation." Examples of this kind of radioactive material are
cesium, cobalt, iridium and strontium.
From the point of view of a terrorist, both types of radioactive material have
their attractions. Obviously, a terrorist might well try to get his hands on a nuclear
weapon or on weapons-usable material to try to construct a crude bomb on the
basis of the publicly available "cook books." But a terrorist might well also aim at
obtaining the other radioactive material in an attempt to make a "dirty" bomb.
THE TREATY ASPECTS TO THE PROBLEM

The international community has, up to now, not looked at the two
12
"dangerous" aspects of radioactive material in any comprehensive manner.
There are now two treaties currently being negotiated on aspects of nuclear
terrorism, with some overlap between them; not exactly ideal. Both could include
measures of prevention but both are woefully weak in that regard.
THE CONVENTION IN THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL
13
The "Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material" (CPPNM)
was adopted in 1980 under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), the U.N.-related international "watch-dog" organization with
technical expertise in the area of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 14 The

7. How Nuclear Bombs Work, Marshall Brain's How Stuff Works, at
http://www.howstuffworks.com/nuclear-bomb3.htm (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
8. Energy Fact Sheet, Nuclear Fission, at http://www.iclei.orglefacts/fission.htm (last visited

Sept. 22,2002).
9. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, March 5, 1970, U.N.T.S. no 10485, vol.
729, availableat http://www.unog.ch/disarm/distreat/npt.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2002).
10. See Johnson, supra note 5.

11. Id.
12. See Johnson, supra note 1.

13. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 28, 1979, IAEA doc.
NFCIRC/274/Rev.1 [hereinafter CPPNM].
14. Profile of the IAEA, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/About/Profile/ (last visited Sept. 6,
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CPPNM concerns only weapons-usable material and mandates a few preventive
measures, but only during international transport.' 5 It also criminalizes various
acts, such as theft and illegal acquisition, possession, and use if nuclear material6
while in storage or during transport, whether domestic or international.'
Otherwise, how countries protect and make secure their own nuclear material is
left for them to decide, a matter of domestic sovereignty. Outside the framework
of the CPPNM, the IAEA in 1999 published specific preventive measures, which
States should take in order to protect nuclear material from theft and nuclear
facilities from sabotage. They are even termed "requirements," but in fact and in
law are only recommendations.' 7 Such measures include, for example, the posting
of guards and construction of barriers.' 8 A review process was started in 1999 to
ascertain if and how the CPPNM could be strengthened. 19 For a long time the
Director General of the IAEA and various Governments held that the treaty is too
limited and needs strengthening. Laudably, the U.S. initially proposed amending
the Convention to make the 1999 IAEA recommendations binding. In addition, it
proposed including in the Convention some form of review mechanism by which
countries would be held accountable for what they do to protect and secure their
nuclear material and facilities. While no public records of these meetings exist,
there have been reports that these proposals were opposed by none other than some
of our "grand coalition" partners against terrorism: the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and Belgium.20
As a result of opposition, the U.S. agreed in May 2001 to a "package deal" at
a meeting of experts held in Vienna. 2 1 By the terms of that deal, the scope of the
CPPNM was notionally expanded to cover domestic use, storage, and transport of
nuclear material as well as sabotage of nuclear facilities. But no new specific
preventive measures were required. Instead, broad "Objectives and Fundamental
Principles" are to be included in the revised CPPNM. These are vague, general
obligations without specifics. Examples of such "Objectives" are: "To protect
against unauthorized removal of nuclear material in use and storage, and during
transport," and "[tjo investigate or minimize the radiological consequences of
sabotage."
Examples of "Fundamental Principles" include "Fundamental

2002).
15. See CPPNM, supra note 16, at art. 1Ipara. 1.
16. See Id, at art. VII.
17. See The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities, Table of Contents, at
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/protection/inf225rev4/rev4_content.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2002); See also Id at Preface [hereinafter Preface].
18. See Id at Introduction. See also Requirements for Physical Protection Against Unauthorized
Removal of Nuclear Material in Use and Storage, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/
protection/inf225rev4/rev4_removal.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2002); See also Requirements for
Physical Protection Against Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities and Nuclear Material During Use and
Storage, at http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/program/protection/ inf225rev4/rev4_sabotage.html (last
visited Sept. 6, 2002).
19. George Bunn, Raising InternationalStandardsfor ProtectingNuclear Materialsfrom Theft
and Sabotage, THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW, 154 (Summer 2000).
20. Id. at 152.
21. Id. at 152-154.
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Principle A: Responsibility of the State. The responsibility for the establishment,
implementation and maintenance of the physical protection regime within a State
rests entirely with that State;" and "Fundamental Principle I: Defense in Depth
The State's requirements for physical protection should reflect a concept of several
layers and methods of protection (structural or other technical, personnel and
organizational) thai leave to be overcome or circumvented by an adversary in order
to achieve his objectives." 22 Countries are left free to decide how to implement
these "Objectives and Fundamental Principles", which basically are descriptive at
best and a mere "wish list" at worst.
In fact, the May 2001 package deal went further and specifically excluded
from future consideration the two most important proposed amendments: (a)
even taking note of them); and
making the 1999 preventive measures binding (or
23
mechanism.
review
of
sort
some
establishing
(b)
That was pre-September 11th. In the light of the lessons learned from
September 11th, the U.S. should revert to its earlier proposals and insist on the
need to do so. Meetings of legal and technical experts are being held in Vienna at
24
various times throughout 2002 to consider finalizing possible amendments.
Thus, the time to act is now.
THE DRAFT TREATY FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM

In New York, the Legal Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
has before it a draft treaty initially proposed by the Russian Federation on the
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.25 Contrary to the IAEA's CPPNM, this
draft is focused on both kinds of radioactive material; both the "weapons-usable"
material and other material, which can be dangerous to life and limb. It includes
the usual criminalization provisions and a weak preventive measure, calling on
countries to simply take into account IAEA recommendations on the protection of
radioactive material.26
After September 1 th, the General Assembly should take a policy decision
that binding preventive measures should be included in the treaty. The drafters
must go beyond their focus on the suppression of criminal acts and the
extradition/prosecution of perpetrators.
The next meeting at which the General Assembly is due to take up the issue is

22. See International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference document, Nuclear Verification
and Security of Material: Physical Protection Objectives and FundamentalPrinciples, Sept. 14, 2001,
IAEA doc. GC(45)/INF/14 Attachment, available at http://www.iaea.org/worIdatom/About/Policy/
GC/GC45/Documents/gc45inf-14.pdf [hereinafter General Conference].
23. ld.
24. Id.
25. See General Conference, supranote 29.
26. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of
17 December 1996, available at gopher://gopher.un.org/00/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-37.en (last visited
Sept. 6, 2002).
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in September 2002.27 The Assembly should task the Director General of the IAEA
to submit draft preventive measures, which could be included as requirements in
the treaty. What is important is that a policy decision be made by Governments to
include such provisions in the treaty. The experts competent in the field would be
instructed to come up with technically viable texts for Governments to examine
and insert into the treaty.
ARGUMENTS FOR MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO

Those against the position advocated above may argue that the package deal
in the IAEA is a "done deal," the "train has left the station," and that we should not
risk undoing the results already achieved. They may argue that an overly legal,
treaty approach is too detailed, will take too much time, and disregards the
technical complexities involved. Others might worry that if the treaty were too
specific about preventive measures, it would reveal to would-be terrorists sensitive
information on how security is maintained, which they could then try to
circumvent. Another argument is that the U.S. and others are quietly, behind the
scenes, already providing sufficient protection and security advice to a number of
countries on a bilateral basis.
In reply to those who would argue we must stick to the pre-September 11 th
"package deal," under the law of treaties commitments can be adjusted in the event
of a fundamental change of circumstances (i.e., September 11th). Moreover, while
sensitive security matters must indeed be kept from potential terrorists. But the
1999 IAEA recommendations are already public; making them binding has nothing
to do with revealing secrets. Existing IAEA advisory missions on physical
protection have not resulted in exposing sensitive matters. Bilateral measures may
play a very important (if somewhat unknown) role in helping countries develop
preventive measures but tools at the multilateral level should not be overlooked if
we are engaged in comprehensive global efforts to combat terrorism.
There may be a legitimate concern that even if European coalition partners
were to go along with binding preventive measures, certain nuclear powers such as
China and Russia could still oppose them. It might be better to have consensus on
broad generalities than to have meaningful preventive measure accepted by some
but not all. But consensus is not the only test. Binding preventive measures
adopted by the other States of the former Soviet Union would be valuable in and of
itself, even if Russia were not immediately on board. Besides, Governments
would be reluctant to be perceived as "hold outs" in the campaign against global
terrorism.
WHAT IS NEEDED: POLICY-MAKERS FOCUSING ON THE ISSUE

One of the reasons the people of the United States established the Constitution
in 1789 was to "provide for the common defense." After September 11th, one
27. See Forthcoming General Assembly 57h Session: To Open on 10 September 2002, available
al http://www.un.org/ga/57/document57.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2002).
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could reasonably assume that the U.S. public wants our government to take all
possible and lawful measures to ensure that innocent civilians will never again be
subjected to such attacks by fanatical, suicidal purveyors of death and destruction,
and that all tools should be examined for use in that effort, including international
treaties.
These are public policy matters requiring the attention of policy-makers who
must be made aware of the problem, have options, weigh and balance the elements,
make informed decisions, and give instructions to the technical and legal experts as
to what the policy is. This is a matter of providing for the security and well-being
not only of Americans, but also of basically everyone on the planet. It should be
seen as part of the global campaign against terrorism, as well as of the homeland
security effort.
It is time for policy-makers to focus on the treaty-making aspect of this
campaign. The U.S. should go beyond "feel good" treaty amendments with no
"bite". If the drafters of nuclear terrorism treaties ignore the lessons of September
11th, they do so at their, and our, peril.

